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Abstract
Knowledge Management (KM) has been recognized as a critical management strategy in
generating competitive advantage for the organization. In order to protect organizational
knowledge stored in or transferred through company’s Knowledge Management Systems
(KMS), information security controls have to be incorporated into these systems. However,
overly strict controls may adversely impact the perceived usefulness of the system and
consequently its usability. This research examines the impact of security measures on
perceived usefulness of KMS. More specifically, we investigated the impact of security
training, security policy and technology on the perceived usefulness of KMS. Security
self-efficacy, perceived personal responsibility, content quality, and perceived ease of use
were included as mediating factors. The proposed research model was tested empirically
through a survey of 51 IT professionals working at a large public university who are
currently using a secure knowledge repository. Results show that security training impacts
perceived personal responsibility directly and through security self-efficacy of the user. KMS
security level affects perceived ease of use both directly and through content quality of the
system. As expected, perceived personal responsibility and perceived ease of use impact
perceived usefulness of the KMS. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings
are discussed.
Keywords: Knowledge management system, security measures, perceived usefulness
1. Introduction
Knowledge management (KM) has been recognized as a critical management strategy in
generating competitive advantage for the organization (Grant, 1996). Information technology
is recognized as an important enabler for the implementation of KM initiatives (Alavi &
Leidner, 2001). The class of information technologies that support and enhance the various
KM processes is known as Knowledge Management Systems (KMS) (Alavi & Leidner,
2001).
KMS Technology
Technical Security Solution
KMS Supporting Technology:
• Database, Repository
Access Control (Authentication, Authorization)
• BBS, Forum, Groupware
Encryption, Issue Specific Policies
KMS Platform Technology:
• Intranet
Firewall, SSH, VPN, IDS, Issue Specific Policies
Table 1. Technical Security Solutions for KMS

The advent of modern web technology has enhanced the capability of KMS by allowing
larger amounts of knowledge resources to be made available to organizational employees.
However, the greater availability of online knowledge has also increased the likelihood of its
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unauthorized access and abuse by both employees and outsiders. Previous research (Gold et.
al, 2001; Liebeskind, 1996) highlights that only upon securing its valuable knowledge assets
can the organization sustain the competitive advantage created by them. Thus, in order to
guard KMS from security threats, various security technologies have been incorporated into
these systems. Table 1 shows various security technologies that could be used to guard KMS.
The term secured knowledge management systems (secured KMS) refers to those KMS that
are under the protection of such security mechanisms (Thuraisingham, 2004). However,
security technologies such as firewalls and anti-virus software alone are insufficient to
manage the security challenges of the Internet age (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). As
humans are often an inherent source of security threats and vulnerabilities, security policies
that specify acceptable and unacceptable actions in using these systems are necessary
(Whitman & Mattord, 2003).
Though added security mechanisms (policies and technology) could provide better protection
for knowledge assets in the organization, if applied inappropriately, they may be restrictive in
nature and conflict with the open sharing culture required to promote KM initiatives
(Liebeskind, 1996). Motivated by these concerns which has not been addressed by previous
literature, the purpose of this study is to identify and understand the security related factors
that influence users’ perception of the usefulness of secured KMS. Such an understanding
may lead to organizational interventions or technology design considerations which can
promote usage of secured KMS and thereby enhance the effectiveness of the organization’s
KM strategy (Gray 2000).
2. Literature Review
Past KMS studies have identified various factors that might affect users’ perception of KMS
usefulness. These include the output quality of the KMS, effort of using KMS, an
individual’s KMS experience, and social norms (Liaw & Huang, 2003; Kankanhalli, 2002).
However, the impact of security mechanisms on KMS usefulness has not been considered.
The information security and organizational behavior literature are reviewed to investigate
the possible impacts.
Information security is defined as the protection of information and systems that use, store
and transmit that information (NSTISS, 1994). The purpose of information security is to
protect the three characteristics of information, namely confidentiality, integrity and
availability, through both technical solutions and managerial actions (NSTISS, 1994). Some
previous literature (e.g., Whitman and Mattord 2003) has suggested that the increase in
system security strength would protect the content quality and overall quality of the system
perceived by users. On the other hand, other studies (e.g., Johansson 2001) pointed out that
high security strength could reduce the usability of the information system. For example,
Nelson (2003) showed that high security strength might hinder users in their work if it denies
them access to resources or services they need. Such an impact of security measures on the
convenience of using a system might affect users’ perception of usefulness of the overall
system.
Past information security and organizational behavior literature has also shed light on the
individual characteristics that might affect the user acceptance of and resistance to security
measures and secured information systems. Frank et al. (1991) showed that perceived
personal responsibility, informal norms, personal computer (PC) knowledge, and PC
experience might have an impact on the security related behaviors of PC users in an
organization. Other studies (Adams and Sasse 1999) found that users’ understanding of
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security issues and awareness of security threats greatly affect their perception of the
usefulness of security mechanisms and the overall secured system. Based on the above
literature and concepts, we have developed a research model that relates system security
measures (level and training), system characteristics (content quality) and individual factors
(security self-efficacy and perceived personal responsibility) to the acceptance of secured
KMS.
3. Research Model and Hypotheses
Figure 1 presents the research model and hypotheses of this study. We propose that KMS
security level impacts perceived ease of use of secured KMS both directly and mediated
through content quality. Security Training/Awareness Effort is expected to impact perceived
personal responsibility both directly and through security self-efficacy. In turn, perceived
ease of use and perceived personal responsibility are proposed to influence perceived
usefulness of the secured KMS.

Security Training/Awareness
Effort

H5
Perceived Personal
Responsibility

H6
Security Self-efficacy

H8

H7
Perceived Usefulness of
Secured KMS

KMS Security Level
•
Technology
•
Policy

H1

Perceived Ease of Use
of Secured KMS

H2
Content Quality

H4

H3
Figure 1. Proposed Research Model

KMS Security Level refers to the clarity, comprehensiveness, and intensity of the security
controls implemented in the secured KMS. Both technical security solutions implemented
and security policies imposed on the system are part of the security controls (Whitman &
Mattord, 2003). Perceived ease of use refers to “the degree to which a person believes that
using a particular system would be free of effort” (Davis 1989). A broader view of ease of
use includes elements such as ease of learning, ease of control, and understandability (Davis
1989). Strict policies imposed on the system restrict users from accessing the content when
needed (Nelson, 2003). Security technologies such as complex authentication models and
encryption methods using concepts unknown to users also make the system difficult to
understand and to use (Johansson, 2001). Therefore, we posit that,
H1. KMS security level is negatively related to the perceived ease of use of the secured KMS.

On the other hand, by protecting the integrity, availability and confidentiality of the content
in the system, security controls could help to preserve the overall content quality of the
system (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). Content quality is a major determinant of overall IS
quality (Liaw & Huang, 2003), which has a positive effect on individual’s perceived ease of
use of information systems. Hence, we hypothesize,
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H2. KMS security level is positively related to the content quality of the secured KMS.
H3. Content quality is positively related to the perceived ease of use of the secured KMS.

Perceived usefulness is defined as “the degree to which a person believes that using a
particular system would enhance his or her job performance” (Davis, 1989). The less effort
needed to use a system, the more it may be used to increase job performance. Effort saved
due to improved ease of use may be redeployed, enabling a person to accomplish more work
for the same effort (Davis, 1989). Thus, we expect that,
H4. Perceived ease of use is positively related to the perceived usefulness of the secured KMS.

Security Training/Awareness Effort refers to the organization’s effort in building in-depth
security knowledge and improving understanding of the security needs of its employees
(Whitman & Mattord, 2003; Adam & Sasse, 1999). Users’ perceived personal responsibility
for the results of their actions is a form of psychological contract which is defined as
“expectations about the reciprocal obligations that compose an employee-organization
exchange relationship” (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). Previous research showed that
organizational effort in providing security training and awareness programs could help users
of the system better understand the purpose for security and recognize their respective
responsibilities in safeguarding the security of the system (Adam & Sasse, 1999). Therefore,
we hypothesize,
H5. Security Training/Awareness Effort is positively related to user’s perceived personal responsibility.

Moreover, studies (Compeau and Higgins 1995) have shown that support from the
organization could increase individuals’ judgment of self-efficacy. We refer to self-efficacy
with respect to the secured use of the secure system as security self-efficacy. The
organizational effort of providing training and awareness programs to employees is expected
to improve their judgment and their ability (Bandura, 1982) in using the system in a secured
manner. Also, people with strong self-efficacy beliefs in performing certain tasks will be
more committed to the tasks and more likely to take responsibility for their actions (Staples et.
al., 1998). Therefore, we posit,
H6. Security Training/Awareness Effort is positively related to security self-efficacy.
H7. Security self-efficacy is positively related to perceived personal responsibility.

Previous studies (Morrison and Robinson 1997) indicate that individuals would seek to assign
responsibility when they are faced with unknown situations in performing a task. This
process results in the assignment and recognition of responsibility. Once users recognize their
responsibilities in using a secured KMS, their perceptions regarding the usefulness of the
technology will be favorably enhanced (Ozag & Duguma, 2004). This leads us to the
following hypothesis,
H8. Perceived personal responsibility is positively related to the perceived usefulness of the secured KMS.

4. Research Methodology
The survey research method was adopted to collect data for testing our theoretical model. A
step-by-step process recommended by Churchill (1979) was used to develop the survey
instrument.
4.1 Construct Operationalization
Where available, constructs have been measured using tested items from prior studies to
enhance validity. Where this was not possible, we generated new items based on a review of
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past literature. KMS security level (KMSL) was measured using items (self-developed and
from Straub 1990) for technology aspects (KMST) and policy aspects (KMSP). KMST
assessed access control, authentication, firewall, and encryption levels. KMSP measured
clarity, comprehensiveness, and accessibility of policies and enforcement of penalties.
Security training and awareness effort (STAE) measured the effectiveness of security training
programs in the organization and their frequency (based on Martins & Eloff 2001). Content
quality (CTQL) assessed the accuracy, reliability, and timeliness, of content (from
Kankanhalli 2002) as well as belief in the integrity of the content (from Whitman and
Mattord 2003). Perceived personal responsibility (PPRP) was measured as the understanding
of roles and responsibilities related to use of secured KMS. Security self-efficacy (SSEF)
items were modified from computer self-efficacy items (Compeau & Higgins 1995) to suit
the security context. Perceived ease of use (PEOU) and perceived usefulness (PUFN) of the
secured KMS were assessed using standard measures from Venkatesh (2000), Venkatesh &
Davis (2000), and Rai et al. (2002). Two items for STAE were frequency measures based on
a six-point scale ranging from 0 ("Never Before") to 5 ("less than once in 6 months"). The
rest of the items were measured using the 7-point Likert scale. Table 2 gives the items for the
constructs after validation.
KMS Security Level (Policy)
KMSP1
There are clearly written rules and procedures guiding the use of secured knowledge
management system.
KMSP2
There are comprehensive written rules and procedures guiding the use of secured knowledge
management system.
KMSP3
There are too many rules and procedures guiding the use of secured knowledge management
system.
KMSP4
There is strict enforcement of written rules and procedures.
KMSP5
The penalties for misuse of the secured knowledge management system are severe enough.
KMSP6
The information security policies are readily available for reference.
KMS Security Level (Technology)
KMST1
The level of access control for the secured knowledge management system is fine-grained.
KMST2
The authentication level for the secured knowledge management system is high.
KMST3
The security setting level of the firewall securing the secured knowledge management system
is high.
KMST4
The encryption strength of the encryption algorithm used by the secured knowledge
management system is high.
Security Training and Awareness
STAE1
My organization holds information security awareness program.
[] Weekly [] Monthly [] Quarterly[] Half yearly [] Less than once in 6 months [] Never Before
STAE2
My organization sends me for information security training.
[] Weekly [] Monthly [] Quarterly[] Half yearly [] Less than once in 6 months [] Never Before
STAE3
My organization ensures that I am aware of information security relating to the use of the
secured knowledge management system.
STAE4
My organization educates me about the concept of information security of the secured
knowledge management system.
STAE5
My organization gives me specific training about the information security procedures which I
need to follow when using the secured knowledge management system.
Content Quality
CTQL1
The secured knowledge management system provides me with reliable knowledge that I need.
CTQL2
The secured knowledge management system provides me with timely knowledge that I need.
CTQL3
The secured knowledge management system provides me with accurate knowledge that I need
CTQL4
I am confident that the knowledge in the secured knowledge management system is kept
secure.
CTQL5
I am confident that the knowledge in the secured knowledge management system cannot be
illegally modified.
CTQL6
I am confident that the knowledge in the secured knowledge management system will be
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available when I require it.
I believe that knowledge in the secured knowledge management system is always in its
original state, and hence can be trusted.
Perceived Personal Responsibility
PPRP1
I understand the consequences of circumventing security practices of the secured knowledge
management system.
PPRP2
I understand that user’s level of responsibility for the security of the secured knowledge
management system.
PPRP3
If I discover suspicious/unusual occurrences happening on the secured knowledge
management system, I will report it to the security personnel.
PPRP4
I feel that I need to comply with all the security practices guarding the secured knowledge
management system when I am using the system.
Security Self Efficacy
SSEF1
I know what knowledge should be kept confidential.
SSEF2
I know what knowledge should be kept confidential. if there was someone giving me step by
step instructions.
SSEF3
I know what knowledge should be kept confidential if there was no one to tell me what to do.
SSEF4
I know what knowledge should be kept confidential if I have seen someone using it before
I know what knowledge should be kept confidential if I have a copy of written procedures and
rules to refer to
Perceived Ease of Use
PEOU1
Interacting with the secured knowledge management system does not require a lot of my
mental effort.
PEOU2
It is not laborious to comply with the security mechanisms when I am using the system.
PEOU3
The security mechanisms do not impede my access to the knowledge I want from the system.
PEOU4
It is easy to understand the interaction requirements of the system and any messages generated
by the system.
PEOU5
I find it is easy to get the secured knowledge management system to do what I want it to do.
Perceived Usefulness
PUFN1
Using secured knowledge management system improves my job performance
PUFN2
Using secured knowledge management system enhances my effectiveness on the job
PUFN3
I find that the secured knowledge management system is useful to my job.
PUFN4
The secured knowledge management system makes my job easier to accomplish.
Table 2. Constructs and Items
CTQL7

4.2 Survey Administration
The 50 item survey was administered to 68 IT professionals working in the IT departments of
a large public university. Out of these distributed questionnaires, 51 were returned, resulting
in a total response rate of 75%. All chosen respondents are users of a KMS called
“Developer’s Corner”, which is used to store and exchange software system development
related knowledge within the IT departments of the university. Role-based access control is
implemented in guarding the system, and the system is strictly open only to the developers
within the departments. A cover letter explaining the significance of the study and assuring
the confidentiality of responses was included with the survey instrument. All the respondents
were volunteers. Nevertheless, they were given a token payment for their participation.
Gender
Male
Female
Age
21-29
30-34
35-39
40-50

Frequency

Percentage

35
16

68.6%
31.4%

13
26
6
6

25.5%
51.0%
11.8%
11.8%
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Education
Diploma
Bachelor
Master
Doctorate
Working Experience
0-3
3-6
6-9
9-12
12-15
>=15

1
28
21
1
3
12
15
13
4
4
Table 3. Profile of Respondents

2.0%
54.9%
41.2%
2.0%
5.9%
23.5%
29.4%
25.5%
7.8%
7.8%

4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 delineates the profile of the respondents. The majority of the respondents are male
(68.6%), aged between 30 and 34 (51%) and have either a Bachelor or Master degree (96.1%).
Over 94% of the respondents have at least 3 years of working experience.
5. Data Analysis
Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis, a Structure Equation Modeling (SEM) technique, was
employed to assess our model. PLS evaluates the measurement model (relationships between
items and constructs) within the context of the structural model (relationships among
constructs) (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). This technique does not require multivariate normal
distribution or large sample sizes for its data. In addition, it is able to handle both formative
and reflective manifest variables jointly occurring in one structural model (Falk & Miller,
1992). In the current study, KMS security level is a formative construct as it consists of
several dimensions and the indicators of each dimension are measures that form or cause the
creation or change in the construct (Bollen, 1984). Besides, given that the sample size for this
study is relatively small, PLS is appropriate for this study. PLS-Graph version 3.0 was used
in data analysis to assess the measurement and structural models.
Constructs and Items
Item Weights
Constructs and Items
Item Weights
KMS Security Level
KMS Security Level
KMSP1
0.43***
KMST1
0.31**
KMSP2
-0.18*
KMST2
0.08
KMSP3
-0.60***
KMST3
0.47***
KMSP4
0.35***
KMST4
0.07
KMSP5
0.10
* Indicates item is significant at p < 0.05 level;
** p < 0.01 level; *** p < 0.001 level
KMSP6
-0.22*
Table 4. Item Weights for KMS Security Level

5.1 Evaluation of Measurement Model
The measurement model consists of relationships between the constructs and the items used
to measure them. Its strength is demonstrated through convergent and discriminant validity
(Hair et. al, 1998). It should be noted that reflective and formative constructs need to be
treated differently during the evaluation. Examination of correlations or internal consistency
among the measuring items of formative constructs is irrelevant (Mathieson et al., 1996).
However, the absolute value of the items weights for formative constructs will be examined
instead. The evaluation of formative constructs and reflective constructs will be separately
discussed in the following sections.
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Formative Construct
There is one formative construct in this study, the KMS Security Level. The item weights are
examined to identify the relevance and level of contribution of the items to this construct.
From Table 4, we can see that KMSP3 and KMST3 contribute most to the KMS Security
Level. This suggests that users of the system consider that the KMS security level is mainly
determined by the number of rules and procedures guiding the use of the system and the
strength of firewalls imposed on the system.
Constructs
Item
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Average Variance
and Items
Reliability
Alpha
Deleted
Extracted (AVE)
Security Training and
0.85
0.64
Awareness Effort
STAE1
0.64
0.87
STAE2
0.67
0.85
STAE3
0.91
0.79
STAE4
0.91
0.78
STAE5
0.82
0.81
Content Quality
0.94
0.73
CTQL1
0.89
0.93
CTQL2
0.90
0.92
CTQL3
0.85
0.93
CTQL4
0.81
0.93
CTQL5
0.79
0.94
CTQL6
0.84
0.93
CTQL7
0.90
0.92
Perceived Personal
0.91
0.78
Responsibility
PPRP1
0.93
0.86
PPRP2
0.91
0.86
PPRP3
0.90
0.87
PPRP4
0.79
0.92
Security Self Efficacy
0.82
0.56
SSEF1
0.83
0.86
SSEF2
0.62
0.72
SSEF3
0.89
0.72
SSEF4
0.59
0.75
Perceived Ease of Use
0.87
0.67
PEOU1
0.65
0.88
PEOU2
0.89
0.82
PEOU3
0.86
0.84
PEOU4
0.80
0.85
PEOU5
0.87
0.83
Perceived Usefulness
0.96
0.90
PUFN1
0.95
0.95
PUFN2
0.96
0.95
PUFN3
0.95
0.95
PUFN4
0.94
0.96
Table 5.Convergent Validity for Reflective Constructs

Reflective Constructs
The rest of the constructs, other than the KMS Security Level, are reflective constructs.
Convergent validity is assessed for these constructs by testing a) item reliability, b)
Cronbach’s Alpha and c) average variance extracted (AVE) by each construct (Fornell and
Larcker, 1981). As shown in Table 5, all 29 items have loadings on their respective constructs
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greater than 0.50, and 24 out of 29 items have a loading above 0.78. This indicates that these
items have sufficient item reliability (Barclay et al., 1995). All constructs have Cronbach’s
Alpha values of 0.70 and above, indicating adequate internal consistency (Nunnally, 1978).
All AVE are well above 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Hence all reflective constructs of our
model showed adequate convergent validity.
Constructs

Items

Component
1
2
3
4
Security Training/ STAE1
-0.18
0.01
0.24
0.61
Awareness Effort
STAE2
-0.23
0.17
0.12
0.69
(STAE)
STAE3
0.32
0.13
0.25
0.80
STAE4
0.34
-0.02
0.19
0.85
STAE5
0.29
0.21
-0.01
0.81
Content Quality
CTQL1
0.80
0.27
0.04
0.22
(CTQL)
CTQL2
0.79
0.25
0.15
0.16
CTQL3
0.82
0.08
0.10
0.11
CTQL4
0.74
0.15
0.14
0.00
CTQL5
0.74
0.13
0.21
0.04
CTQL6
0.85
0.13
0.03
-0.03
CTQL7
0.86
0.04
0.16
0.14
Perceived
PPRP1
0.08
0.24
0.88
0.20
Personal
PPRP2
0.06
0.21
0.86
0.21
Responsibility
PPRP3
0.22
0.23
0.81
0.14
(PPR)
PPRP4
0.40
0.14
0.66
0.11
Security Self
SSEF1
0.26
0.15
0.31
0.12
Efficacy
SSEF2
-0.04
0.06
-0.06
-0.07
(SSEF)
SSEF3
0.17
0.04
0.18
0.25
SSEF4
0.06
0.14
-0.07
0.02
Perceived Ease
PEOU1
0.23
0.05
0.29
0.05
of Use
PEOU2
0.30
0.43
0.08
0.20
(PEOU)
PEOU3
0.44
0.40
0.12
0.08
PEOU4
0.43
0.21
0.31
0.24
PEOU5
0.44
0.47
0.02
-0.06
Perceived
PUFN1
0.12
0.89
0.21
0.14
Usefulness
PUFN2
0.15
0.89
0.19
0.13
(PUFN)
PUFN3
0.27
0.82
0.26
0.16
PUFN4
0.20
0.88
0.21
0.06
Eigenvalue
6.07
4.14
3.41
3.35
Variance (%)
20.93
14.29
11.75
11.54
Cumulative Variance (%)
20.93
35.21
46.97
58.51
Table 6. Factor Loadings for Reflective Constructs

5
0.12
0.14
0.03
0.03
-0.01
0.22
0.05
-0.09
0.20
0.15
-0.05
0.08
0.04
0.08
-0.02
0.06
0.51
0.91
0.79
0.88
0.06
-0.02
0.09
0.04
0.05
0.13
0.04
0.17
0.11
2.72
9.37
67.88

6
0.29
0.18
-0.06
-0.01
0.01
0.20
0.22
0.21
0.20
0.01
0.17
0.10
0.10
0.13
0.17
0.16
0.14
0.02
0.10
-0.07
0.69
0.68
0.56
0.55
0.60
0.12
0.15
0.17
0.18
2.45
8.45
76.34

Discriminant validity of the reflective constructs can be assessed by two ways: a) examine
factor loadings, and b) examine item correlations (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In our study,
six factors were extracted from factor analysis using principal components (Table 6). All item
loadings on stipulated constructs are greater than the required 0.5 (Hair et. al., 1998) and all
eigenvalues are well above one, indicating that the construct is stable and items anchor well
All the non-diagonal entries in Table 7 are smaller than the six diagonal entries of the specific
constructs, indicating that measures of the constructs correlate more highly with their own
items than with items measuring other constructs in the model. Thus, we conclude that
discriminant validity of the scales is adequate in this study.
STAE

CTQL

PPRP
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SSEF

PEOU

PUFN

STAE
CTQL
PPRP
SSEF
PEOU
PUFN

0.64
0.12
0.73
0.20
0.16
0.78
0.13
0.15
0.14
0.56
0.12
0.45
0.26
0.13
0.67
0.11
0.20
0.26
0.13
0.40
Table 7. AVE vs. Squares of Correlations among Constructs

0.90

5.2 Evaluation of Structural Model
Given an adequate measurement model, the hypotheses could be tested by examining the
structural model. The result of structural model analysis for the proposed model is presented
in Figure 2. The predictive and explanatory power of the model is assessed first based on the
amount of variance in the endogenous constructs for which the model could account. Our
model explained 25% of the variance in perceived personal responsibility, 55% of the
variance in perceived ease of use, and 44% of the variance in perceived usefulness of the
secured KMS. As the threshold for adequate explanatory power is 10% (Falk and Miller,
1992), we consider our model possesses sound predictive validity.
Security
Training/Awareness Effort

*Significant at p<0.05;

H5, 0.36**

** Significant at p<0.01;
***Significant at p<0.001

Perceived Personal
Responsibility (PPRP)

H6, 0.36**
Security Self-efficacy

H7, 0.25*

R2 = 0.13

Perceived Usefulness of
Secured KMS

KMS Security Level
•
Technology
•
Policy

H1, 0.38**

H2, 0.57***

R = 0.33

R2 = 0.44
Perceived Ease of Use
of Secured KMS

Content Quality
2

H8, 0.25*

R2 = 0.25

H4, 0.50***

(PEOU)

H3, 0.45**

R2 = 0.55
Figure 2. Path Diagram

Hypothesis
H1: KMSL to PEOU
H2: KMSL to CTQL
H3: CTQL to PEOU
H4: PEOU to PUFN
H5: STAE to PPRP
H6: STAE to SSEF
H7: SSEF to PPRP
H8: PPRP to PUFN

Path Coefficient
T-value
P-value
0.38
2.80
0.01
0.57
7.04
0.001
0.45
3.24
0.01
0.50
3.57
0.001
0.36
2.54
0.01
0.36
2.48
0.01
0.25
1.92
0.05
0.25
2.09
0.05
Table 7. Hypotheses Testing Results

Outcome
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

After computing parameter estimates for all paths in the structural model, bootstrap
resampling method was employed to compute T-values for all paths (Table 7). Given that
each hypothesis corresponded to a path in the structural model, support for each hypothesis
could be determined based on the sign (positive or negative) and statistical significance for its
corresponding path. As shown in Table 7, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, H7, and H8 are supported at
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the significance level of 0.05 while H1 is not supported (significant but in the opposite
direction hypothesized).
6. Discussion and Implications
This research addresses the impact of security related factors on individual cognitive
reactions to the secured KMS. Consistent with many other system acceptance studies,
perceived ease of use has been shown to be an important determinant of the perceived
usefulness of the secured KMS. As expected, KMS security level impacts perceived ease of
use both directly and through the content quality produced by the KMS. This result suggests
that the usefulness of the KMS can be enhanced by increasing content quality and perceived
ease of use. Users of the KMS are concerned with the quality of knowledge they obtain from
the system. Hence, security mechanisms (e.g. file hashing, access control and encryption) that
are used to protect knowledge integrity, availability, and confidentiality will be welcomed by
users.
Besides, our results also indicate that individuals with high security self-efficacy beliefs and
good understanding of their security responsibilities (perceived personal responsibility) tend
to have a more positive perception of the usefulness of the secured KMS. We also found that
organizational effort in building security training and awareness programs is effective in
developing such individual characteristics. This finding suggests that for the effective
protection of KMS, merely introducing strong security measures is not enough. People feel
the secure systems are useful when they fully understand the purpose of security and their
own roles in securing the KMS. Organizations could provide training and awareness
programs to promote an individual’s understanding and awareness.
Surprisingly, the hypothesized negative impact of KMS security level on perceived ease of
use of the system was not supported. Though trade-offs between security measures and
system usability have been examined and evaluated in previous studies (Johansson, 2001;
Nelson, 2003; Phelps & Mok, 1999), our result showed that end users of the system might
perceive such trade-offs differently. Similar to several other studies (Chadwick et. al. 2002;
Whitman & Mattord 2003) we found that security strength enhances perceived ease of use. In
sight into this phenomenon is revealed from Chadwick et al’s study (2002). Their interviews
with users of the system reveal that once users had gained access to the system, no-one
thought the security software was an imposition, as they did not feel its existence after they
had successfully logged on. This shows that added security does not impose a further burden
on users of the system, if it appears to be transparent to users. Moreover, all respondents in
our study are IT professionals who have an understanding of the security mechanisms behind
the system. Hence, the strength of security mechanisms did not affect their perceptions
towards KMS. This finding suggests that in order to minimize the trade-offs between
usability and security of the system, security mechanisms should be designed so that they are
as transparent to users as possible.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we proposed a research model that attempts to explain the impact of security
related factors on the user’s perception of usefulness of secured KMS. The research model is
tested empirically through survey questionnaires administered with current users of a secured
KMS. Results indicated that security related individual characteristics, such as security
self-efficacy and perceived personal responsibility, have a significant effect on the perceived
usefulness of the system. Organizational effort in holding security training and awareness
program could help the users of the system to build up such individual characteristics. The
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study also found that high security strength imposed on the system has a positive impact on
users’ perceived ease of use of the system, both directly and indirectly through the
improvement in the content quality of the system. The perceived ease of use of the system
affected the individual perception of system usefulness.
It is important to note that these results should be interpreted in light of the study’s limitations.
A larger sample size can be used in future studies to improve the statistical power of the
results. Moreover, respondents in this study are all IT professionals with technical expertise,
so attempts to generalize the results to other contexts must be done cautiously. In moving
forward, the research model could be evaluated with subjects of different IT expertise in the
future.
This study has made an initial attempt to investigate how security measures imposed on the
KMS affect users’ perception towards the usefulness of the system. Future research could
further extend our study to investigate the impact of security measures on the overall usage
pattern of the secured KMS. Besides, this research focuses only on the effect of security
related factors. These factors were able to account for 44% of the variance in perceived
usefulness. Future research could include other possible antecedents of KMS usage such as
trust and pro-sharing norms. It will be interesting to study how these factors interrelate to the
factors of this study in determining users’ perceptions on the secured KMS.
As more organizational knowledge resources are made available online through KMS, this
increases both benefits and threats to organizations. Security measures are required to protect
the knowledge assets within. However, just the presence of such mechanisms does not
guarantee KMS effectiveness. By understanding the impact of these mechanisms on
individual’s perceptions towards KMS, organizations can learn how to make the mechanisms
more effective.
References
Adams, A. and Sasse, M.A. “Users Are Not The Enemy. Why users compromise computer
security mechanisms and how to take remedial measures”, Communications of the ACM,
Vol. 42, No.12, pp. 42-46, 1999.
Alavi, M. and Leidner, D.E. “Review: Knowledge management and knowledge management
systems: Conceptual foundations and research issues”, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 25, No.1, pp.
107-136, 2001.
Bandura, A. “Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency”, American Psychologist, Vol. 37,
No. 2, pp. 122-147, 1982.
Barclay, D., Higgins, C., and Thompson, R. “The Partial Least Square Approach to Causal
Modeling: Personal Computer Adoption and Use as an Illustration”, Technology Studies,
Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 398 – 422, 1995.
Bollen, K.A. “Multiple Indicators: Internal Consistency or No Necessary Relationship?”
Quality & Quantity, Vol.18, pp. 377-385, 1984.
Chadwick, D.W., Carroll, C., Harvey, S., New, J., Young A. J. “Experiences of Using a
Public Key Infrastructure to Access Patient Confidential Data over the Internet”,
Proceedings of the 35th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, pp.
156-166, 2002.
Churchill, G.A. “A Paradigm for Developing Better Measures of Marketing Construct”,
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 64-73, 1979.
Compeau, D.R. and Higgins, C.A. “Computer Self-Efficacy: Development of a Measure and
Initial Test”, MIS Quarterly, Vol.19, No.2, pp. 189-211, 1995.
540

Davis, F.D. “Perceived Usefulness, Perceived Ease Of Use, And User Acceptance of
Information Technology”, MIS Quarterly, Vol.13, No.3, pp. 319-341, 1989.
Dhillon, G.. and Backhouse, J. “Current directions in IS security research: Towards
socio-organizational perspectives”, Information Systems Journal, 11(2), 127-153, 2001.
Falk, R.F. and Miller, N.B. A Primer for Soft Modeling, Akron, Ohio, Univ. of Akron Press,
1992.
Frank, J., Shamir, B. and Briggs, W. “Security-related behavior of PC users in organizations”,
Information & Management, Vol. 21, pp. 127-135, 1991.
Fornell, C. and Larcker, D.F. “Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable
variables and measurement error”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol.18, No.1, pp.
39-50, 1981.
Gold, A.H., Malhotra, A. and Segars, A.H. “Knowledge Management: An Organizational
Capabilities Perspective”, Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol.18, No.1, pp.
185-214, 2001.
Gray, P.H. “The effects of knowledge management systems on emergent teams: towards a
research model”, Journal of Strategic Information Systems, Vol. 9, pp. 175-191, 2000.
Grant, R.M. “Towards a Knowledge-based Theory of the Firm”, Strategic Management
Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 109-122, 1996.
Hair, J.F., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L., and Black W.C. Multivariate Data Analysis, Fifth
Edition, Prentice-Hall Int. Inc, 1998.
Johansson, L. Trade-offs between Usability and Security, M.E. Thesis, Linköping Institute of
Technology, Sweden, 2001.
Johnson, R.A. and Wichern, D.W. Applied Multivariate Statistical Analysis, Fourth Edition,
Prentice-Hall Int. Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA, 1992.
Kankanhalli, A. Understanding Contribution and Seeking Behavior in Electronic Knowledge
Repositories. PhD. Thesis, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 2002.
Liaw, S.S. and Huang, H.M. “An investigation of user attitudes toward search engines as an
information retrieval tool”, Computers in Human Behavior, Vol. 19, pp. 751–765, 2003.
Liebeskind, J.P. “Knowledge, Strategy and the Theory of the Firm”, Strategic Management
Journal, 17, pp. 93-107, 1996.
Martins, A. and Eloff, J. “Measuring Information Security”, Proceedings of 1st Workshop on
Information-Security-System Rating and Ranking, Williamsburg, Virginia, ACSA, 2001
Mathieson, K., Peacock, E., and Chin, W.W. “Extending the Technology Acceptance Model:
The Influence of Perceived User Resources”, Working Paper WP 96 – 18, Faculty of
Management, University of Calgary, 1996.
Morrison, E.W. & Robinson, S.L. “When employees feel betrayed: A model of how
psychological contract violation develops”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.22,
No.1, pp. 226-256, 1997.
National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security. National Training
Standard for Information Systems Security Professionals, 20 June 1994, file, Available
from World Wide Web <http://www.nstiss.gov/Assets/pdf/4011.pdf>.
Nelson, R. Institutional Information on the Web: Balancing Security and Access. Presented at
the Higher Education Data Sharing Consortium Conference (HEDS), 2003, retrieved Feb
2005 at: http://ir.ups.edu/IROffice/HEDS%20Paper%202003.htm
Nunnally, J.C. Psychometric Theory. Second Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New
York, 1978.
Ozag, D. and Duguma, B. “The Relationship between Cognitive Processes and Perceived
Usefulness: An Extension of TAM2”, Proceedings of 23rd Annual Organizational
Systems Research Association Conference, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2004, retrieved Feb
2005 at: http://www.osra.org/2004/ozag.pdf
541

Phelps, R. and Mok, M. “Managing the Risks of Intranet Implementation: An Empirical
Study of User Satisfaction”, Journal of Information Technology, Vol.14, pp. 39-52, 1999.
Rai, A., Lang, S.S. and Welker, R.B. “Assessing the Validity of IS Success Models: An
Empirical Test and Theoretical Analysis”, Information Systems Research, Vol.13, No.1,
pp. 50–69, 2002.
Staples, D.S., Hulland, J.S. and Higgins, C.A. “A Self-Efficacy Theory Explanation for the
Management of Remote Workers in Virtual Organizations”, Journal of
Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol.3, No.4, 1998.
Straub, D.W. “Effective IS security: An Empirical Study”, Information Systems Research,
Vol.1, No.3, pp. 255-276, 1990.
Thuraisingham, B. “Secure Knowledge Management”, Secure Knowledge Management
Workshop, Buffalo, New York, Sept 2004, retrieved Feb 2005 at:
http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/caeiae/skm2004/presentation_slides/invited/Keynote-D1-Bha
vani-final/Keynote-D1-Bhavani.ppt
Venkatesh, V. “Determinants of Perceived Ease of Use: Integrating Control, Intrinsic
motivation, and Emotion into the Technology Acceptance Model”, Information Systems
Research, Vol.11, No.4, December 2000, pp. 342-365.
Venkatesh, V. and Davis, F.D. “A Theoretical Extension of the Technology Acceptance
Model: Four Longitudinal Field Studies”, Management Science, Vol. 46, No.2, pp.
186-204, 2000.
Whitman, M.E. and Mattord H.J. Principles of Information Security. First Edition, Course
Technology, Canada, 2003.

542

